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1 Introduction
Price risks associated with lean crop yields, wars, and economic crises are persistent
problems. Historically, global futures markets have been established to hedge such risks.
In general, a futures market is characterized as a well-organized forward market of a
commodity, and it provides a fine index of the expected commodity price. However, it is
not clear how and to what extent government interventions affected both the futures and
physical markets of agricultural commodities of colonized countries before World War II.
Steam locomotives and steamships became popular after the Industrial Revolution.
These new transportation channels provided mass, high-speed transportation. They also
enabled rapid and expanding commercial transactions including foreign trade. However,
the expanding trade with more distant locations exposed traders to greater price risks.
Accordingly, futures markets were established in the 19th century, for example, in Chicago
(founded in 1848), Frankfurt (founded in 1867), New York (founded in 1870), and Lon-
don (founded in 1877) (see Kaufmann (1984, p.11)). The futures market in Japan was
established in the early 18th century.
The Tokugawa Shogunate, which was formed in 1603, enjoyed a long period of rule
throughout Japan and stabilized the internal economy and civic order. The stability of the
17th century allowed authorities to improve transportation infrastructure such as roads,
coastal routes and harbors. The infrastructure improvements increased trade among
remote locations. The Shogunate also permitted shipbuilders to build large merchant
vessels under a stable military in 1638. This permission enabled mass transportation.
Thus, Japan experienced expanding trade among remote locations beginning in the 17th
century. While rice trading became more active, rice merchants faced greater price risk
because of changing commercial transactions. Accordingly, the Shogunate certified the
Dojima Kome Kaisho (i.e., the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange) in 1730.
The Osaka-Dojima rice futures market only traded domestic rice in the Tokugawa era.
This limited trading was the result of severe restrictions on foreign trade and international
relationships, called Sakoku, enforced by the Shogunate. The isolation policy began in
the mid-17th century. However, the market began to trade domestic rice and imported
rice after the late 19th century. We consider the consequences of the difference between
the two eras with respect to rice futures.
Japan concluded the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France, Netherlands, Rus-
sia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in 1858 and opened the ports in 1859.
The Meiji government declared a new regime in 1868. Discarding the isolation policy of
the previous authority, Japan adopted Western technologies and modernized transporta-
tion infrastructure for steam locomotives and steamships. The resumption of foreign
trade and the introduction of modern infrastructure resulted in an increase in commercial
transactions in Japan. Commodity futures trading also became more active. Rice was
a major commodity in the futures markets and was traded in the two major commodity
futures markets in Tokyo and Osaka. Taketoshi (1999) examines the efficiency of the
Tokyo rice futures market using the Fama and French’s (1987) model. Shizume (2011)
studies the rational expectation formation of rice futures in the Osaka rice futures market
using Hamilton’s (1987) model. Nakanishi (2002) and Koiwa (2003) discuss the evolution
of the two major rice futures markets considering the correlation of price and shares of
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trade changes over time. However, the previous literature has paid little attention to the
characteristics of the rice market in prewar Japan and the nation’s dependency on rice
from its colonies.
In prewar Japan, the rice policy had great significance for food supply policy but also
price stabilization policy. Rice has been the staple food since ancient times in Japan, and
fluctuation in rice prices was the primary cause of fluctuation in general price levels. In
fact, 13% of the weight of the Tokyo Wholesale Price Index in the 1933 Base was the
rice price. The weight of cotton yarn, the second largest weight, was only half that of
the weight of rice (see Bank of Japan, Research and Statistics Department (1987, p.40)).
Accordingly, the Japanese government paid particular attention to the fluctuation in rice
prices. For example, in 1890, Masayoshi Matsukata, the finance minister, mentioned, “The
rice price increases significantly more than the price of any other commodities, and people
live in dire poverty. Alongside increases in rice prices, workers will force manufacturers
to raise their wages. In addition, they may provoke riots or commit theft.”1 That is, the
government feared that a rising rice price would result in cost-push inflation and aggra-
vate public security. Accordingly, rice imports grew after the 1890s in Japan. However,
increasing rice imports caused an increase in the outflow of specie money. Consequently,
the government imported rice from the Japanese colonies.
When Japan won the Japanese-Sino War, from the year 1894 to the year 1895, the
country gained Taiwan as the first Japanese colony. In 1910, Japan annexed the Korean
peninsula. In prewar Asia, Japan was the only country possessing colonies, and it im-
ported food and resources from its colonies: rice, sugar, soybean, and salt. Japan was
growing colonial trading. Since the 17th century, European countries owned colonies in
the Americas, Africa, and Asia. The colonies supplied foods and resources to the home
countries. However, Japan depended on its colonial trading to a greater extent than
European countries (see Okubo (2007) and Hori (2009, pp.72–75)). In particular, domes-
tic rice production had not met increasing demand from domestic consumers because of
rapid industrialization and urbanization since the 1890s. Japan compensated for the in-
sufficiency in domestic rice supply by importing colonial rice. However, few studies focus
on the effect of colonial trading on commodity markets in prewar Japan.
Ito et al. (2016a) show that the efficiency of each of the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures
markets varied over time using a non-Bayesian time-varying VAR model. The authors
argue that government intervention allowing imported rice deliverables in the futures
markets reduced efficiency. In prewar Japan, the consumer recognized that the quality
of imported rice, including Taiwanese and Korean rice, was lower than domestic rice. In
fact, Sugihara (1996, pp.32-33) notes that there was an obvious difference in price between
domestic rice and imported rice, and the price gap increased until the early 1910s. In
addition, Mochida (1970, pp.135–145) mentions that Korean rice was mainly concentrated
in Osaka. Hence, rice circulating in Osaka was different from the rice circulating in Tokyo.
Although the previous studies elucidate that there was a difference in the rice spot market
between Tokyo and Osaka, Ito et al. (2016a) ignore rice trading in the spot market because
they use only the futures price data. Therefore, the authors do not discuss the interrelation
between the two major rice markets for spot and futures rice prices.
1See Ota (1938, p.182).
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This paper studies the interrelation between spot and futures prices in the two major
rice markets in prewar Japan from the perspective of market efficiency. We then examine
how government intervention disrupted and ameliorated the efficiency measures of the
spot and futures rice markets. Our examination has four components. First, we estimate
the well-known equation for spot returns and futures premiums and test its parameters
to examine whether the markets were efficient. Second, we test the parameter constancy
in the estimation procedure. Third, if there is doubt, we estimate the parameters of the
equation at each period assuming that the two major rice markets are confronted with
continuous structural change. At this stage, we use a non-Bayesian time-varying model
approach, which allows us to estimate the parameters and to conduct statistical inference
from a residual-based bootstrap technique (see Ito et al. (2014, 2016b)). Fourth, we detect
when the efficiency measure of the rice markets dropped and investigate the possibility
that government interventions in the rice markets affected the efficiency measure. Then,
we historically investigate how government interventions disrupted and ameliorated the
efficiency measure of the rice markets.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a short historical review of rice
markets in Japan. Section 3 presents our methodology for our non-Bayesian technique
for a linear regression equation with time-varying parameters. This section also provides
statistical inference for the above time-varying parameters based on a residual-based boot-
strap method. Section 4 describes the data on the rice futures markets in prewar Japan.
Section 5 summarizes our empirical results of econometric analyses of time-varying re-
gression model with the rice futures data. Section 6 argues the background of the results
and shows their historical interpretation. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Historical Review of the Rice Markets in Japan
The Meiji government declared a new regime in 1868. The following year, the Meiji
government forbade the Osaka rice futures market to trade because it considered the
activity to be gambling. Rice traders requested the government to reopen the futures
market. The government permitted the rice futures market in Osaka to resume trading
in 1871 (see Tsugawa (1990, pp.26–40)). In the same period, rice traders in Tokyo sought
to establish another rice futures market, and two rice futures markets were set up in
Tokyo. First, Hachirouemon Mitsui, a wealthy merchant in Tokyo, began futures rice
trading through his company, Boueki Shosha, in 1871. Chugai Shogyo Kaisha, supported
by representative merchants in Kagoshima, began rice futures trading in 1874. These
two rice futures markets in Tokyo were unified in 1883 and were renamed Tokyo Kome-
Shokaisho (i.e., the Tokyo Rice Exchange).2 The two major exchanges in Tokyo and
Osaka led the rice futures markets before World War II in Japan from the 1880s.
Until the mid-1920s, the exchanges had not dealt with physical rice. The two major
exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka began to allow rice traders to trade physical rice within the
exchanges in Tokyo in 1923 and Osaka in 1928 (see Ota (1938, pp.1148, 1156). Therefore,
rice traders in the exchanges only traded in futures. There were three transactions with
respect to different contract months in the Japanese rice futures markets; a nearby con-
2See Tokyo Grain Exchange (2003, pp.27–36) for details.
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tract (one month), a second nearest contract (two months), and a deferred contract (three
months). That is, the longest contract was three months. It was shorter than any other
market worldwide; 12 months was the longest contract period in many futures markets.
In fact, the longest contract period of representative futures markets, such as the wheat
futures market in the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, the cotton futures market in the New
York Cotton Exchange, and the Egyptian cotton futures market in the Liverpool Cotton
Exchange was 12 months in the 1920s (see Kamibayashi (1935, pp.67–68)). However,
the Japanese government was concerned that the markets would treat rice futures with a
longer contract period because futures trading had amounted to a gamble in the Osaka
rice futures market in 1869 (see Haneji (1989, pp.67–97)). In short, the basic framework
of rice futures trading did not change in prewar Japan. In contrast, the circumstances
around the rice spot markets changed frequently.
In the 1880s, rice exports to Europe increased. From 1884 to 1889, the amount
increased from 0.5 million koku to 1.4 million koku.3 Particularly, the main destination of
rice exports was the United Kingdom. In fact, 50 per cent of rice exports from Japan was
shipped to the United Kingdom in 1889 (see Omameuda (1993, p.21)). This situation
arose from two causes. First, the yen against the pound increased in the 1880s. From
the early to the late 1880s, the pound-yen exchange rate depreciated from four yen to
seven yen (see Sugihara (1996, p.34)). Second, demand expanded while the supply did
not increase in the European food market. In the late 1880s, the growing rice exports
from Burma, the center of the rice supply to Europe, was stagnant. In addition, barley,
wheat, and potato crops failed in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in 1888
(see Omameuda (1993, pp.29–30)). Under the circumstances, the Japanese government
directly exported rice.
In 1880, the government enacted Biko Chochiku Ho (the Emergency Rice Stocks Law)
to stock rice in anticipation of a crop failure. This law allowed the government to buy
and sell rice physically in the spot market. Because the shelf life of rice was only a few
years, the government had to sell some quantity of rice even if the rice crop in Japan
was plentiful. However, the supply of rice exceeded demand in the late 1880s. From the
early to the late 1880s, the volume of rice production increased by 15 per cent while the
population grew by 6% in Japan (see Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha (1927, p.634) and Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1909, pp.1–2)). The government did not sell
the inventory of rice in the domestic market because it was concerned with the falling
price of rice. Instead, the government sold rice in the foreign market to prevent the rice
price from declining in the domestic market and to earn specie money. Specifically, the
government exported rice actively from 1886 to 1889 (see Ota (1938, p.165)). During this
period, the ratio of rice exported by the government to the total amount of rice export
from Japan was 26% (see Omameuda (1993, pp.20–21)). However, the terms of overseas
rice trading changed again in the 1890s.
Since the 1890s, rice demand in Japan had exceeded its supply. Japan suffered from
a chronic shortage of rice, and rice imports exceeded exports after the 1890s. In the
1890s, Japan imported rice from the Southeast Asian countries and Korea. However,
beginning in the 1900s, rice imports from the Japanese colonies increased. Imported rice
3Koku is a unit root of rice trading volume in Japan. One koku is equal to 180.39 liters.
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from the colonies was of a different variety than domestic rice. The former was an indica
variety, and the latter was japonica, and each variety has a different texture and taste.
When rice was shipped from Korea, farmers and brokers mixed sand, stones, and other
impurities into rice sacks to cheat their trading partners by commodity weight. The rice
traders dealing in Korean rice had to polish the rice with sand and stones. To this end,
rice traders prepared dedicated milling machines that could decontaminate the sand and
stones from the Korean rice. Particularly, the rice traders who had the milling machines
for the Korean rice clustered in Osaka (see Hishimoto (1938, pp.591–598)). Therefore, the
rice from Korea was concentrated in Osaka because Korea is situated nearer Osaka than
to Tokyo (see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1938, p.2)). Finally,
Korean rice trading in Japan at that time was characterized by, first, an imbalance in the
regional distribution of Korean rice in Japan and, second, an increase in rice imports that
diversified the distribution of rice in Japan.
Unlike the actual rice distribution, the rice futures markets continued to deal in domes-
tic rice. However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce first forced the exchanges to
accept imported rice as an alternative to deliverable rice within 1890. This intervention
and other similar interventions were aimed at suppressing the futures rice price when
Japan faced a serious shortage of rice. Then, the futures markets often permitted rice
traders to deliver imported rice of a different quality than domestic rice.
After the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the rice price continued to increase al-
though Japan addressed the rice shortage aggressively. The government attempted to
suppress rice price increases and forced the futures markets to accept imported rice as
a deliverable regularly in 1912. During the same period, the Governor-General of Korea
promoted japonica rice cropping in Korea. This policy had gradually reduced quality
differences between domestic and Korean rice since the late 1910s.
The nationwide riots, kome-soudo (the rice riots), occurred in 1918, spurred by a se-
rious rice shortage caused by speculative holding-off by merchants who anticipated an
increase in rice prices because of planned intervention by the Japanese Imperial Navy
during the Soviet revolution and a self-fulfilling rise in price from this expectation. Re-
flecting on the disruption from the riot, the government began to intervene in the rice
spot market and, in 1921, established the Rice Law. The first article of the Rice Law
stated that if the government recognized the necessity to adjust rice supply and demand,
it could buy, sell, change, process, and store the rice (see Ota (1938, p.332)). In short,
the Rice Law allowed the government to buy and sell physical rice directly to adjust rice
supply and demand. However, the government always intervened in the rice spot market
by selling and buying only after estimating the supply and demand of rice (see Omameuda
(1993, pp.198–201)). In 1925, the government amended the Rice Law to overcome the
problems with supply and demand. Practically, the term “rice supply and demand”, in
the first article was replaced by “the volume in circulation and price of rice.”4 That is,
the government could flexibly respond to changes in price in the rice spot market. In the
late 1920s, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry owned the physical rice in stock to
reduce excessive volatility of rice price following the new Rice Law.5
4See Ota (1938, pp.335–336) for details.
5The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was separated into the Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in April 1925.
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3 The Model
This section presents our econometric method used to examine the time-varying structure
of the Japanese rice futures market in the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa periods (1868–
1945). We employ a time- varying econometric model rather than testing statistically the
efficient market hypothesis given the whole sample data to identify how and when the two
rice futures markets changed in prewar Japan. In other words, the ordinary econometric
models examine economic theories with historical data while our methods use a time-
varying VAR model to explore historical events and the background that would change
economic circumstances. Particularly, we examine when the rice futures markets faced
structural changes in prewar Japan based on time-varying estimates of the VAR model.
The method is partly based on Ito et al. (2014), who analyze the dynamic linkages
of stock prices among G7 countries and the efficiency of international stock markets.
However, our method focuses on the dynamic relation between the rice futures premium
and the returns on spot rice in prewar Japan; we examine the time-varying estimates
of the fundamental equation for the futures premium. Employing a non-Bayesian time-
varying model approach, we conduct statistical inference for the time-varying estimates
using a residual-based bootstrap technique.
3.1 Preliminaries
This paper considers the relation between the rice futures premium and the returns
on spot rice. Following earlier studies (e.g., Ito (1993) and Wakita (2001)), we adopt the
fundamental equation for the futures premium as our starting point:
(logSt+k − logSt) = α + β(logFt+k|t − logSt) + ut, (t = 1, 2, · · · , T − k), (1)
where St is the spot price at time t, Ft+k|t is the futures price at time t for delivery
at time t + k, and ut follow an independent and identically distributed process. That
is, we consider the k-th period forward contract. This type of regression equation is
typically employed to test the unbiasedness hypothesis in the context of financial market
efficiency. In practice, the null hypothesis is that (α, β) = (0, 1) and {ut} are serially
uncorrelated. Note that the hypothesis refers to the joint hypothesis of risk neutrality (or
no-risk premium) and rationality. In other words, the hypothesis states that no informed
speculators can expect to make excess returns (see Brenner and Kroner (1995) for details).
In an efficient market, nobody accrues profit because of no arbitrage. In such a market,
the coefficients β in the fundamental equation (1) is one, and α is zero. That is, there
exists no systematic capital gain from futures trade, because the expected prediction
error, E[(St+1 − St) − (Ft+k|t − St)] = E[St+1 − Ft+k|t], is zero. On the other hand, in
an inefficient market, some traders gain profits because of the existence of prediction
error, which represents some arbitrage. In such a situation, the greater its deviation from
one, the more some traders accrue profit from the arbitrage. Thus, we can consider the
absolute deviation of β from one as an efficiency measure of the market, and it allows us
to detect inefficiency.
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3.2 Non-Bayesian Time-varying Regression Models
Suppose that there is concern for the time-varying structure of a possibly efficient
futures market of the k-th period forward contract. The time series of spot returns
xt = logSt+k − logSt and futures premiums yt = logFt+k|t − logSt should be examined.
Note that xt and yt at t are theoretically considered an unknown futures return and its
predictor. In practice, attention is given to the differences between the two variables
xt − yt at each period to study the time-varying predictive performance of futures. How-
ever, this approach does not make sense. Because xt − yt = logSt+k − logFt+k|t, time
series of the differences would exhibit a nearly white noise process with small values at a
high probability. The reason is that St and Ft+k|t typically have a unit root, are highly
correlated, and present spurious correlation. The above approach provides us with no
information on the futures market.
We adopt another approach using Ito et al.’s (2014) non-Bayesian time-varying model
for Equation (1). This approach estimates the coefficients in Equation (1), possibly vary-
ing over time. We use the following equation:
(logSt+k − logSt) = α + βt(logFt+k|t − logSt) + ut, (t = 1, 2, · · · , T − k). (2)
This is a linear regression of the returns on spot rice on the rice futures premium. We
consider whether β varies with time; we regard α as time-invariant considering its insignif-
icance in the preceding works. Equation (2) cannot be estimated because it is uniden-
tifiable. Thus, many preceding works estimating a model with time-varying parameters
assume a dynamic equation for such parameters, for example, random walk. We assume
that βt follows a random walk represented as follows:
βt+1 = βt + vt, (t = 1, 2, · · · , T − k), (3)
where each vt follows an independent and identical distribution. We consider Equations
(2) and (3) together as a state space model. Following Ito et al.’s (2014), we employ a
non-Bayesian technique to estimate the parameters in the state space model using time
series of St and Ft+k|t as data.6 We consider Equations (2) and (3) together to estimate
the parameters α, β1, · · · , βT−k by using the following matrix form:
y1
y2
...
yT−k
β0
0
...
0

=

1 x1 O
1 x2
... . . .
1 O xT−k
0 1 0 O
0 −1 1
... . . . . . .
0 O −1 1


α
β1
β2
...
βT−k
+

u1
u2
...
uT−k
v1
v2
...
vT−k

, (4)
where xt = logFt+k|t − logSt, and yt = logSt+k − logSt for t = 1, 2, · · · , T − k. This
helps us to estimate the coefficients and to conduct statistical inference using a bootstrap
6See Ito et al.’s (2014) Online Technical Appendix A.1, which is available at http://at-noda.com/
appendix/inter_market_appendix.pdf for details.
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technique shown in the next subsection. We estimate the state vectors (α β1 β2 · · · βT−k)′
at one time based on observations x1, x2 · · · , xT−k, y1, y2 · · · , yT−k and a prior β0 given by
OLS or GLS that are familiar with economists. This vector estimate is identical to the
Kalman smoother with a fixed interval of the corresponding state space model, Equations
(2) and (3).78
3.3 Statistical Inference for Time-varying Parameters
This subsection presents our methodology for statistical inference on the time-varying
estimates of βt’s in Equation (2). The idea is so simple that we examine the estimates
with the joint distribution of our time-varying estimator βˆ1, βˆ2, · · · , βˆT−k under the un-
biasedness hypothesis that βt = 1 for any t and α = 0. After setting a significance level,
for example, 95%, we construct upper and lower bounds based on the distribution as
two time series: βU1 , βU2 , · · · , βUT−k and βL1 , βL2 , · · · , βLT−k. Then, using a confidence band
constructed from the two series of bounds, we examine in what period the βˆt estimates
are inside the band to identify the efficient market periods.
However, we cannot employ an asymptotic theory to construct the confidence bands
on time-varying coefficients that are supposed to follow a random walk. This difficulty
stems from the asymptotes involved in a Brownian motion or Brownian bridge, and
it is complex to derive them theoretically; their distributions can only be represented
with some Brownian motion or Brownian bridge if it is successful. That is, such dis-
tributions require a Monte Carlo technique to conduct some statistical inference. We
are obliged to adopt a residual-based bootstrap technique to construct parameter confi-
dence bands of a state space model under the assumption of the unbiasedness hypothesis:
(α, β1, · · · , βT−k) = (0, 1, · · · , 1) for our time-varying model. We consider the case where
each βt is estimated by the above method while the data are generated by Equation (1)
when (α, β) = (0, 1).
In practice, our residual-based bootstrap technique consists of the following steps.9
First, we fit Equation (1) to the observed data. Then, we obtain a residual sequence D0 =
(uˆ1, uˆ2, · · · , uˆT−k). Second, we extract N bootstrap samples Di = (uˆ(i)1 , · · · , uˆ(i)T−k), i =
1, 2, · · · , N with a replacement from D0 considering it an empirical distribution of the
residuals. Third, we generate N sets of (uˆ(i)1 , · · · , uˆ(i)T−k) for i = 1, 2, · · · , N using Di for
i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Fourth, we estimate N sets of the time-varying coefficients and their
corresponding residuals by applying our time-varying model (4) to N bootstrap data
(x1, x2, · · · , xT−k, y(i)1 , y(i)2 , · · · , y(i)T−k) and a prior β0 given for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Finally, we
construct a confidence band of (α, β1, · · · , βT−k).
7See Ito et al.’s (2016b) Online Technical Appendix A.1, which is available at http://at-noda.com/
appendix/evolution_appendix.pdf and Maddala and Kim (1998, ch.15) for details.
8Our method for estimating random parameter regression models is different from the method in the
literature of the 1970s (see Swamy (1970), Swamy (1975) and Swamy and Tinsley (1980) for example).
The latter study focuses on stationary stochastic coefficients such as an autoregressive moving average
model (ARMA) process, whereas our study focuses on coefficients following a random walk, a non-
stationary process.
9See Ito et al.’s (2014) Online Technical Appendix A.3, for which the basic idea is found in Lütkepohl’s
(2005) Appendix D.3.
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4 Data
We utilize the weighted average monthly data on the rice spot and futures prices in
prewar Japan. For the rice futures data, three contract months of the Tokyo and Osaka
rice exchanges are available: a nearby contract (one month), a second nearest contract
(two months), and a deferred contract (three months). For the rice spot data, spot prices
in Tokyo are on the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market, and the spot prices in Osaka are the
wholesale prices of rice in Osaka. These datasets consist of the following three statistics:
(i) Nakazawa (1933) for all futures prices from October 1880 to November 1932, (ii) the
Tokyo City Statistics and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1931, p.342) for the spot
prices in Tokyo from April 1881 to November 1932, and (iii) Miyamoto et al. (1979) and
the Osaka City Statistics for the spot prices in Osaka from April 1881 to November 1932.10
There are a few missing values in both sets of statistics. Therefore, we fill in the missing
values using a seasonal Kalman filter. We take the first difference of the natural log of
the spot rice prices to obtain the returns on spot rice, and we subtract the natural log
of the spot rice prices from the natural log of the rice futures prices to calculate the rice
futures premium.
(Table 1 around here)
From Table 1, we confirm that the longer the contract month, the more volatile the
futures premium. Table 1 also shows the results of the unit root test with descriptive
statistics for the data. For our estimations, all variables that appear in the moment con-
ditions should be stationary. To confirm whether the variables satisfy the stationarity
condition, we apply the ADF-GLS test of Elliott et al. (1996). We employ the modi-
fied Bayesian information criterion (MBIC) instead of the modified Akaike information
criterion (MAIC) to select the optimal lag length. This is because, from the estimated
coefficient of the detrended series, ψˆ, we do not find the possibility of size-distortions (see
Elliott et al. (1996); Ng and Perron (2001)).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Preliminary Results
We assume a time-invariant regression model with constant parameters for our pre-
liminary estimations. Table 2 summarizes our estimation results for a time-invariant
regression model for the whole sample: all estimates for α in Equation (1) are almost
zero, and as the contract month of the rice futures is longer, the corresponding estimates
of β are larger. These results suggest that the longer the contract month, the more ef-
ficient the rice market in prewar Japan.11 Taketoshi (1999) obtains different estimates
10Note that the rice futures data of nearby and nearest contract months in Tokyo have different
starting dates from the rice futures data of the deferred contract month. Particularly, the data for the
nearby contract month are available from January 1888, and the data for the nearest contract month are
available from January 1898.
11Note that our estimates of β are slightly larger than Taketoshi’s (1999) estimates because our dataset
is seasonally unadjusted.
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of β for each subsample when the whole sample is split into four subsamples. However,
the author does not examine whether the rice market in prewar Japan is efficient using
conventional statistical inferences. Therefore, we use Ito et al.’s (2016b) non-Bayesian
time-varying regression model to estimate β because the rice market in prewar Japan
may not always be efficient over time. However, we verify if the time-varying regression
model is more appropriate than the time-invariant regression model before we adopt a
new approach. Then, we apply Hansen’s (1992) parameter constancy test to investigate
whether the time-invariant model is a better fit for our data.
(Table 2 around here)
Table 2 presents the results of our preliminary estimations: the estimates of time-invariant
regression models (α and β) and their corresponding Hansen’s (1992) joint parameter con-
stancy test statistics (LC). For our time-invariant regression model, the joint parameter
constancy test rejects the null hypothesis of constancy at the 5% level against the alterna-
tive hypothesis that the parameter variation follows a random walk process. These results
suggest that the time-invariant regression model does not accommodate our data; rather,
we should use the time-varying regression model for the prewar Japanese rice market data
before World War II.
5.2 Time-varying Market Efficiency
Figures 1 and 2 show that the farthest contract month transaction is more efficient
than the nearest and the next-nearest months in both the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures
markets.
(Figures 1 and 2 around here)
The time-varying market efficiency measure of the farthest contract month shows a similar
tendency as the next-nearest months. However, the longer the contract month (maturity)
in futures, the more successfully traders hedged price risks in the rice market.
(Figures 3 and 4 around here)
Figures 3 and 4 show that the farthest contract month transaction was larger than
any other futures transaction in both Tokyo and Osaka. The farthest contract month
transactions amounted to approximately 70% of all futures in both rice markets. This
suggests that the transaction successfully distributed required information to hedge price
risks in the rice market in prewar Japan. Moreover, the time-varying market efficiency
measure of the nearest contract month had a different nature than the next-nearest and
farthest contract months in both Tokyo and Osaka (see Figures 1 and 2). This interesting
feature of the rice futures markets before World War II in Japan reflects that the futures
markets provided settlement on the balance and delivery of physical rice to clear the
nearest month transactions.
(Figure 5 around here)
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Figure 5 shows the delivery volume for both Tokyo and Osaka. The figure indicates
that the sellers constantly delivered physical rice to the buyers to clear their contracts in
both cities. Taishichiro Tanaka, an administration officer of the Osaka Stock Exchange
and a lecturer at Kobe College of Commerce, noted a characteristic of the nearest month
transaction of rice in 1910. Tanaka stated, “The nearest contract month transaction of
rice has a property similar to the spot transaction.”12 According to his assertion, the
nearest contract month transaction had two aspects: a financial market for rice brokers
to hedge price risks and a delivery space for physical rice. Consequently, the delivery
space aspect reduced the market efficiency measure of the futures trading.
Figures 1 and 2 show some periods when even the farthest contract month transaction
in futures showed low market efficiency measure. Specifically, Figure 1 exhibits three such
periods for the Tokyo rice futures market: the late 1880s, the late 1890s, and from the
mid-1900s to the 1910s; Figure 2 exhibits three such periods for the Osaka rice futures
market: the late 1880s, the late 1890s, and from the mid-1900s to the mid-1920s. The
next section discusses why the farthest month transaction sometimes failed to hedge price
risks in the rice market.
6 Historical Interpretation
6.1 Increasing Rice Exports from Japan in the Late 1880s
In the late 1880s, the amount of rice exported increased and the Japanese government
was directly involved in rice exporting. Specifically, the government bought the rice in
the spot market, and sold it abroad as mentioned in Section 1. Omameuda (1993, p.18)
argues that the growing rice exports from Japan in fact caused an increase in the spot rice
price in the domestic market. In other words, government intervention in the rice spot
market affected the price formation of rice. This situation reduced the efficiency measure.
However, according to Figures 1 and 2, the market efficiency measure in Tokyo was lower
than in Osaka. This situation resulted from the difference in supply and demand between
Eastern and Western Japan.
In the 1880s, the place of origin of rice circulated in Tokyo was different from in Osaka.
In Tokyo and Osaka, the rice was supplied from Eastern and Western Japan, respectively.
In addition, the rice produced in Chubu District located midway between Tokyo and Osaka
was circulated in both cities (see Ministry of Finance, Accountant Bureau (1892, pp.17–
22)).13 That is, Tokyo and Osaka were the distribution and consumption centers for rice
in Eastern and Western Japan, respectively. However, the rice supply in Eastern Japan
was tighter than in Western Japan. Because rice is cultivated in tropical regions, it grows
well in Western Japan where the climate is warmer than in Eastern Japan. For example,
in 1888, the volumes of rice production per population in Eastern and Western Japan were
0.79 koku and 0.91 koku, respectively (see Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (1890,
12See Tanaka (1910) for details.
13Chubu District includes Aichi, Shizuoka, Gifu, Nagano, Fukui, Ishikawa, Toyama, Niigata, and
Yamanashi prefectures in the area surrounding Nagoya City.
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pp.45–105) and Statistical Bureau (1909, pp.2-12)). Under the rice supply situation, rice
exports from Western Japan were brisk in the 1880s.
Rice wholesalers around the port of Kobe, the only trading port in Kinki District, were
actively involved in rice exports in the 1880s. The wholesalers observed the change in
domestic and export rice prices and chose either domestic retailers or foreign trade mer-
chants as trading partners (see Omameuda (1993, p.22)). In contrast, rice wholesalers in
Eastern Japan were not involved in rice exports. The Japanese government also did not
buy the rice for export in Eastern Japan. The government bought the rice in Western
Japan including Chubu District and exported it from ports in Western Japan such as the
port of Kobe (see Ministry of Finance, Financial Bureau (1919, pp.162–163)). In short,
the government bought the rice in Western Japan and the Chubu District. Because the
rice produced in Chubu District circulated in the tight rice market in Tokyo, the govern-
ment intervention in the rice spot market in Chubu District seriously affected the price
formation of rice in Tokyo. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo Asahi Newspaper) addressed
this state of affairs in 1888 as follows.
“In recent days, the rice price in futures increased while the rice harvest is
plentiful. The main reason for this situation is that the market participants
expect rice exports from Japan to increase because of the poor wheat harvest
in Europe.”14
In short, the government-led expansion of rice exports disrupted the desired relation
between spot and futures prices. Accordingly, the government intervention reduced the
market efficiency measure in Tokyo severely.
However, a population increase and high growth rates in the big cities such as Tokyo
and Osaka resulted in greater rice consumption after Japan experienced a serious rice
failure in 1890. Then, rice exports rapidly decreased. In the early 1890s, it was possible
to hedge rice price risks in the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets.
6.2 Increasing Rice Imports in the Late 1890s
In contrast to the case of the late 1880s, rice imports grew rapidly in the late 1890s.
(Figure 6 around here)
Figure 6 exhibits JapanâĂŹs rice consumption and imports from 1880 to 1932. The figure
also shows that the ratio of imports to consumption began to increase from the 1890s. As
mentioned in Section I, imported and domestic rice had differences in texture and taste.
Accordingly, Japanese consumers considered imported rice an alternative grain. Con-
sumers mixed domestic and imported rice in meal preparation (see Omameuda (1993,
pp.37–40)). Both the Tokyo and Osaka rice futures markets listed only two standard
brands of rice as domestic rice: Musashi (rice cropped in Saitama prefecture) and Settsu
(rice cropped in Hyogo prefecture). Ito et al. (2016a) show that the most significant inter-
ventions responsible for the low market efficiency measures from the year 1890 were often
government orders that the futures markets should use imported rice as an alternative to
14See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1888) for details.
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the listed domestic rice in futures transactions. That is, the commodity to be traded in
the rice futures markets was domestic rice. When market participants perceived a signifi-
cant difference for longer-term transactions, the futures market was irrelevant to the spot
market.
However, the market efficiency measure estimated in this paper for the year 1890 is
different from the estimation shown by Ito et al. (2016a). The difference between the
market efficiency measure estimated in this paper and Ito et al. (2016a) stem from the
data used in the two papers. We include the futures market and the spot market while
Ito et al. (2016a) use monthly rice futures data only to examine the efficiency measure
of rice futures markets from 1881 to 1932. Ito et al. (2016a) focus on the futures market
ignoring the increasing volume of actual imported rice in the spot market. According
to Figure 6, the ratio of imported rice to rice consumption in 1890 was below 4%. The
ratio in 1890 was lower than the ratios in 1897 and 1898 when rice imports were higher
again during the period after 1890. That is, in 1890, both the rice in the futures and
spot markets was minimally different because imported rice was a minority portion of the
physical rice distributed. Therefore, futures rice transactions in both Tokyo and Osaka
were nearly efficient in 1890.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the efficiency measure of the Osaka rice futures market
in 1890 was lower than that of the Tokyo rice futures market. This result was caused
by critical confusion in the same year in the Osaka rice futures market. The Osaka rice
futures market opposed the government’s order in 1890 to amend the trading rules that
allowed imported rice to be delivered as an alternative to domestic rice. The Ministry
of Agriculture and Commerce revoked the permission for futures markets to trade in
reaction to its disobedience. Consequently, futures trading in Osaka stopped temporarily,
and this critical confusion reduced the market efficiency measure. The increasing volume
of rice imports began to significantly reduce the efficiency measure of rice futures trading
in the late 1890s. Figure 6 shows that the ratio of import to consumption increased
rapidly in the late 1890s because Japan was hit by a record poor harvest in 1897 (see
Ota (1938, p.184)). In the Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market, the largest rice spot market
in Japan, imported rice amounted to 43% of all physical rice in 1898 (see Sasaki (1937,
pp.268–270)). In the same year, imported rice in year-end stock amounted to 54% of all
inventory in the Osaka rice spot market (see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1915, pp.100–
102)). These observations prove a significant difference in quality between rice traded in
the futures market and the spot market. Imported rice was no longer the minority portion
of rice distribution in the late 1890s. The rice market efficiency measure reduced in this
situation. At that time, the rice market in Japan traded in different grain because only
domestic rice was listed in the futures market, and both imported and domestic rice were
traded in the spot market. Although the government forced the futures markets to accept
the imported rice as an alternative to the listed deliverable domestic rice temporarily
from January to October in 1898, the futures price failed to be an accurate index of the
expected price of rice in the late 1890s including 1898. In August 1898, Yomiuri Shimbun
(Yomiuri Newspaper) addressed this situation as follows.
“Since the exchanges have agreed to deliver imported rice, the rice futures
market depends on price fluctuations for imported rice. As a result, the trend
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in rice futures price was different from that of the spot price.”15
This situation reflected that the grading system for delivered imported rice was dif-
ferent from the domestic rice system in the futures markets. The futures markets set up
the substandard imported rice and changed the price difference between the grading of
the substandard rice and imported rice. On the other hand, the price difference between
standard domestic rice and substandard imported rice was basically fixed while the price
difference between domestic and imported rice in the spot market was flexible. Yoshinari
Kawai, a bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce from 1911 to 1919,
stated the reason why the futures markets set up the above-mentioned grading system
(see Hata (1981, p.81)).
“The quality of Korean and Taiwanese rice is lower than that of domestic rice.
In the Tokyo futures market, the price gap between Korean rice and standard
domestic rice is from three yen to four yen. The price gap between Taiwanese
rice and standard domestic one is from five yen to six yen. However, the
lowest quality of deliverable domestic rice is priced about two yen less than the
standard rice. This price gap is smaller than the gap in price between imported
rice and standard domestic rice. Since the quality difference between imported
rice and standard domestic rice is too large, nobody can value the gap between
imported rice and domestic rice. This situation obliges the futures market to
set up the substandard imported rice.”16
In summary, because the quality of imported rice was not the same as domestic rice,
the futures market could not value the gap in price between the two. As a result, this
price gap in the futures market could not move with the gap in the spot market, and the
market structure of rice futures differed from the structure of the rice spot market. This
dislocation in the rice futures markets was settled at the end of the 1890s. In November
1898, the government repealed the order for the futures markets to accept the imported
rice as an alternative to the listed domestic rice. In addition, the ratio of rice imports
to rice consumption decreased rapidly in 1899. However, this ratio began to skyrocket in
1902 and remained above approximately 5%. Japan had been a continuous importer of
rice since the 1890s.
6.3 Difference in Structure Between the Spot and Futures Markets from the Mid-1900s
to the Mid-1920s.
We discuss the decrease in the efficiency measure from the mid-1900s to the mid-
1920s. The market efficiency measure in both Tokyo and Osaka began to decrease in the
mid-1900s. Tokyo Asahi Shimbun reported on the rice market in the late 1900s as follows.
“The price of imported rice was higher than coarse cereals, the price of domestic
rice in the spot market was higher than imported rice, and the price of domestic
rice in the futures market was higher than domestic rice in the spot market.
The futures price was highest in the rice and grains market because most of
the participants in the exchanges were speculators.”17
15See Yomiuri Shimbun (1898) for detail.
16See Kawai (1921, pp.297–298) for detail.
17See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1907) for details.
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That is, the price difference between the spot and the futures markets was caused by
speculative rice trader dealings in the futures markets. However, there are two discrepan-
cies in the low efficiency measures between Tokyo and Osaka from the mid-1900s to the
mid-1920s. First, the Osaka rice futures market failed to provide an accurate index of the
expected price of spot rice that was superior to Tokyo. Second, the period of market ineffi-
ciency in the Osaka rice futures market was longer than that of Tokyo. The futures in the
Tokyo rice futures market failed to provide a fine index of the expected price of spot rice
from the mid-1900s to the 1910s. The efficiency measure of the Osaka rice futures market
reduced until the mid-1920s. The difference in the market efficiency measures between
Tokyo and Osaka was a consequence of the diversity in market structure characterized by
the distribution of imported rice.
According to Figure 6, the volume of Japanese rice imports remained at a low level
from 1899 to 1901, although that volume began to increase in 1902. Specifically, the
ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived from 1901 to 1905 was 27% in the
Tokyo-Fukagawa rice spot market and 23% in the Osaka rice spot market (see Osaka City
Government (1903, pp.72–73); Osaka City Government (1906, pp.79–80); Osaka City
Government (1907, pp.87–88); Sasaki (1937, pp.268–270)). Consequently, the market
efficiency measure in both Tokyo and Osaka decreased in the early 1900s because the
market structure of rice futures was different from the structure of the rice spot market
(see Figures 1 and 2). This situation changed in the late 1900s.
The volume of Japanese rice imports in Japan began to decrease beginning in 1906
(see Figure 6). From 1905 to 1909, the ratio of imported rice to all physical rice ar-
rived in Tokyo decreased to 22% while this ratio in Osaka increased to 27% (see Osaka
City Government (1908, pp.91–92); Osaka City Government (1909, pp.163–164); Osaka
City Government (1910, pp.163–164); Osaka City Government (1911, pp.253–254); Sasaki
(1937, pp.268–270)).18 This asymmetric situation between Tokyo and Osaka was caused
by an increase in imported rice from Taiwan and Korea. From 1905 to 1909, the import
volume of Taiwanese rice increased from 0.7 million koku to 1.2 million koku, and the
import volume of Korean rice increased from 0.1 million koku to 0.5 million koku while
the volume of foreign rice imports decreased from 2.6 million koku to 0.9 million koku
(see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1933, pp.3–4)). To sum up rice
imports in the late 1900s, the volume of all rice imports decreased along with the import
volume of foreign rice, whereas Taiwanese and Korean rice imports increased.
The major destination port for Taiwanese and Korean rice in Japan was the port of
Kobe. When the rice from Taiwan and Korea arrived at Kobe, barge clusters transported
Taiwanese and Korean rice to the nearby port of Osaka, which was almost nine miles
(15 kilometers) away (see Ichinohe (1920, p.561)). Taiwanese and Korean rice differed
in quality from domestic rice. Taiwanese and Korean rice was categorized as the indica
variety as was the imported rice from Indochina. Taiwanese rice varied considerably in
quality because the rice farming method in Taiwan was double cropping (see Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1938, p.27)). Korean rice was mixed with sand,
stone, and other impurities (see Hishimoto (1938, p.598)). Korean rice was concentrated
18The ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in the Osaka rice spot market does not include
the data for 1902, 1903, and 1908 because there are no statistics.
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in Osaka because rice traders who could decontaminate the impurities from Korean rice
clustered in Osaka (see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1938, p.2)).
Osaka Asahi Shimbun reported, “In Osaka, rice traders have excellent sales for Taiwanese
rice because its demand has increased.”19
However, rice futures markets could not trade the imported rice. In the late 1900s,
both the standard and deliverable commodities in the futures markets were domestic rice
only. Therefore, the structure of the futures market differed from the spot market. In
the late 1900s, the market efficiency measure reduced only in Osaka because the ratio
of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in Osaka increased. As a practical measure,
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun urged the government to shrink the market structure differences
between the spot and the futures.20 Although the government forced the futures markets
to accept imported rice from Taiwan and Korea as an alternative to deliverable domestic
rice in June 1912, the futures price in both Tokyo and Osaka failed to be an accurate
index of the expected price in the rice spot market in the 1910s.
The inefficiency resulted from the persistent differences in structure between the spot
and the futures markets. A greater amount of imported rice had been traded in the
spot market since the 1910s. From 1903 to 1918, the volume of domestic rice production
increased to 17.7%. In the same period, the total population and the urban population
with over 100,000 inhabitants increased to 20.2% and 63.1%, respectively (see Bank of
Japan, Statistics Department (1966, pp.12, 14, 108)). Japan faced a rice shortage because
its population growth was greater than its increase in rice production. Japan was forced
to compensate for the rice shortage with rice imports. In the 1910s, the ratio of import
volume to consumption fluctuated dramatically. The ratio increased sharply from 1912
to 1913 and from 1917 to 1919 (see Figure 6).
(Figures 7 and 8 around here)
The ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in both Tokyo and Osaka had
a similar tendency as the ratio of import volume to consumption. However, the ratio of
imported rice to all physical rice arrived in Osaka showed a different propensity to that
of Tokyo in the early 1910s. The ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in
Osaka continued to increase to approximately 50% until 1915 while the rate in Tokyo
reached a peak in 1913 and remained approximately 40% until 1915. This asymmetric
trend between Tokyo and Osaka was caused by an increase in the volume of Korean rice
imports under the same conditions in the late 1900s. From 1912 to 1915, the volume of
Korean rice imports increased from 0.2 million koku to 19 million koku, and the volume
of foreign rice imports decreased from 20 million koku to 0.5 million koku (see Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1933, pp.3–4)). The increase in the volume of
Korean rice imports led to a swelling in the volume of rice arrived from overseas in Osaka.
In Osaka prefecture, the volume of imported rice arrived increased from 0.2 million koku
in 1912 to 0.9 million koku in 1915 with an increase in the volume of Korean rice arrived
from 0.2 million koku to 0.7 million koku for the same period (see Ichinohe (1920, p.420)).
In the late 1910s, the market efficiency measure temporarily improved from 1916 to
1917. This was because the difference in market structure between the spot and the
19See Osaka Asahi Shimbun (1909) for details.
20See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1911) for details.
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futures had shrunk along with the ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in
both Tokyo and Osaka (see Figures 1, 2, 7, and 8). Subsequently, Japan faced a serious
rice shortage from 1918 to 1919. The nationwide riots, kome-soudo (the rice riots) in
1918, were a response to the shortage. At the same time, the ratio of imported rice to all
physical rice arrived in both Tokyo and Osaka surged. From 1912, the government forced
the utures markets to accept imported rice from Taiwan and Korea as an alternative
to listed domestic rice. However, the differences between the spot and futures markets
remained.
Yoshinari Kawai, Director of the Division of Foreign Rice Management at the Ministry
of Agriculture and Commerce from 1918 to 1920 and responsible for controlling the rice
market to stabilize prices and transactions, stated that the fixed price difference in the
futures markets between the standard domestic rice and substandard imported rice was
smaller than the flexible price difference in the spot market between domestic and im-
ported rice (see Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (1981, p.201)). Therefore,
rice traders considered Korean and Taiwanese rice more desirable for delivery in the rice
futures markets than sale in the spot markets. In 1921, Kawai reviewed futures trading
in the 1910s as follows:
“At the maturity date in the exchanges, many sellers tended to use Taiwanese
rice as the rice for delivery. As a result, the futures price fell. However,
the price difference between the spot and the futures did not shrink at the
maturity date. The futures market showed hardly any relationship with the
spot market because the rice futures market strongly depended on the price
of rice from Taiwan and Korea.”21
In the 1910s, the differences in structure between the spot and the futures markets re-
mained because of the failure of the imported rice grading system in the futures mar-
kets. Consequently, the efficiency measure decreased in the same period. This situation
suggested that rice traders could not hedge price volatility risk in the domestic rice mar-
ket.ãĂĂ
In the early 1920s, the turmoil in the rice markets settled. In the same period, the
volume of imported rice arrived in Tokyo decreased and the ratio of imported rice to all
physical rice arrived remained below 30% (see Figure 7). For Osaka, the major destination
of Taiwanese and Korean rice, the volume of imported rice arrived increased, and the
ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived remained over 50% (see Figure 8). Asahi
Shimbun reported that the Osaka rice futures market failed to provide an accurate index
of the expected price in the spot market in the early 1920s. The newspaper stated, “The
futures market in Osaka was disrupted because 440,000 koku of Korean rice was stored
in the city of Osaka. Additionally, the large amount of Korean rice was stored around
Osaka.”22
Therefore, while the market efficiency measure improved in Tokyo, it decreased in
Osaka, reflecting the asymmetric situation between Tokyo and Osaka.
21See Kawai (1921, pp.299–300) for details.
22See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1924c) for details.
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6.4 Improving Market Efficiency in the Late 1920s
In the late 1920s, Tokyo and Osaka futures provided an accurate index of the ex-
pected price of spot rice. The reasons for the improvement in the efficiency measure
were two-fold. First, the rice cultivated in Taiwan and Korea changed in quality. Sec-
ond, government-owned physical rice increased after the late 1920s. With respect to the
changes in Taiwanese and Korean rice, a newspaper published in June 1924 reported that
the quality differences between domestic and Korean rice were less pronounced.
“On June 18, the Society of Housewives held a rice tasting event in Tokyo.
About 70 people from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, the Ministry of
Agriculture and Commerce, the Bank of Korea, the Oriental Development
Company (Toyo Takushoku Company), and so on were invited to the event.
The participants tasted the domestic rice and the Korean rice. They tried to
guess which Korean rice was in all the samples. However, only five of them,
who were the experts on rice trading, guessed Korean rice exactly.”23
After the 1910s, the Governor-General of Korea promoted rice cropping of the japonica
rice variety. The ratio of domestic rice to total rice production in Korea was only 5%
in 1912, 69% in 1921, and 79% in 1932 (see Tohata and Okawa (1939, pp.438–439)).
Additionally, following Korea, the Governor-General of Taiwan introduced japonica rice
cropping in 1924 (see Governor-General of Taiwan (1945, p.244)). Since the introduction
of japonica rice cropping in Korea and Taiwan, rice cropped in the Japanese colonies had
represented most imported rice in Japan. From 1920 to 1930, the changes in Korean,
Taiwanese, and foreign rice import volumes and their ratios to total rice imports were as
follows: the import volume of rice from Korea increased from 1.7 million koku to 5.2 million
koku, Taiwanese rice import volume increased from 0.7 million koku to 2.2 million koku,
and foreign rice import volume increased from 0.8 million koku to 1.2 million koku. Each
change in ratio was from 54.4% to 60.1%, from 21.8% to 25.4%, and from 24.7% to 14.5%
in the same order (see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1933, pp.4–5)).
This implies that the proportion of imported rice categorized as the indica variety arrived
in the rice spot market rapidly decreased. Thus, imported rice had a minimal effect on
rice pricing in the rice futures market and the spot market even under conditions of a
large amount of imported rice. The futures markets shrank the price difference in the
grading system between substandard imported rice and standard domestic rice delivery
after 1925.24
In summary, the changes in rice variety cropped in Korea and Taiwan allowed inland
populations to consume more imported rice; the changes also led to better hedging of
price risk in the rice futures markets.
We discuss the second factor in the efficiency measure improvements in the late 1920s.
With respect to the establishment of the Rice Law in 1921 and its amendment in 1925
by the government, the amended law allowed the government to buy and sell physical
rice directly to adjust the circulation volume and the rice price. Specifically, the Ministry
23See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1924b) for details.
24See Tokyo Asahi Shimbun (1924a) for details.
18
of Agriculture and Forestry had owned the physical rice in stock since 1925 to adjust
the volume of circulation in the rice market. The stock rice owned by the government
amounted to one million koku in 1925 and reached 2.3 million koku in 1931 (see Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1935b, pp.4–5)). This volume in 1931 accounted
for 3.5% of total rice demand in Japan and equaled nearly 44% of the annual volume of
rice arrived in Tokyo (see Figures 6 and 7). From the mid-1920s, government intervention
based on the Rice Law and the change in the variety of imported rice from Korea and
Taiwan stabilized the supply and demand of rice in the main islands of Japan. This
implies that the price risk in the rice market decreased. However, the seasonality price
risk remained. According to Figures 3 and 4, trading volume in both the Tokyo and
Osaka rice futures markets experienced seasonal fluctuations from the mid-1920s. The
trading volume increased in harmony with the expansion of rice distribution in the fall
harvest seasons from the mid-1920s. Therefore, market efficiency measures in both Tokyo
and Osaka improved after the mid-1920s. However, the market efficiency measure was
relatively lower in Osaka than in Tokyo. The difference in market efficiency measure
between Tokyo and Osaka reflected the difference in their market structures.
After the late 1920s, the ratio of imported rice to all physical rice arrived in Osaka
was approximately 80% while the corresponding ratio to Tokyo was approximately 30%
(see Figures 7 and 8). In short, imported rice had occupied the central position in the
rice spot market in Osaka in contrast to Tokyo. Korean rice, which accounted for a large
part of imported rice in Osaka, was of the same variety as domestic rice, but the price of
rice cropped in Korea was lower than domestic rice. For example, the prices per koku of
domestic and Korean rice in Osaka in 1931 were 18.15 yen and 17.29 yen, respectively.
That is, consumers did not consider Korean rice to be the equivalent of domestic rice.
This suggests that the differences in market structure between the spot and the futures
markets reduced the market efficiency measure.
7 Conclusion
This paper argues that a difference in market structure between spot and futures caused
the functional decline of rice futures markets that were supposed to provide efficient fore-
casts of the rice spot price in prewar Japan. This paper also argues that government
intervention in the markets failed to offset the decline. In contrast, the Japanese colonial
government changed in the variety of colonial rice, and the function of rice futures was
improved. Particularly, the difference was caused by rice futures markets’ exclusive ac-
tivity in domestic rice, whereas imported rice of a different variety represented a greater
proportion of rice distribution in Japan.
The government intervened in rice futures exchanges to reduce the difference. The
government forced the major exchanges in Tokyo and Osaka to allow the imported rice to
be delivered, and the intervention practically fixed the differences between the prices of
domestic and imported rice in the futures markets. The corresponding difference in the
spot rice markets could not be adjusted and failed to improve the functioning of the rice
futures markets.
However, when the Japanese colonial government promoted japonica rice cropping
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in the 1910s, market improvements occurred. The promotion reduced the differences in
quality between domestic and imported (Korean and Taiwanese) rice that was distributed
in Japan and the differences in structure between spot and futures markets. Finally, the
rice futures markets regained their functioning.
In summary, the increased volume of imported rice of a variety different from domestic
rice first disrupted the rice futures in prewar Japan. Then, government intervention
in the rice futures markets failed to improve the disruption. Changes in colonial rice
cropping successfully improved the disruption, and colonial rice was promoted to unify
the different varieties of inland and colonial rice. The function of rice futures markets
crucially depended on the differences in rice spot markets’ structure.
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Figure 1: Time-varying Estimates of β: The Case of the Tokyo Rice Market
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Notes:
(1) The dashed red lines represent the 95 percent confidence bands of the estimates in the case of an efficient market.
(2) We run 5,000 times bootstrap sampling to calculate the confidence bands.
(3) R version 3.3.2 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 2: Time-varying Estimates of β: The Case of the Osaka Rice Market
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Note: As for Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Trading Volume of Rice in the Tokyo Rice Exchange
19
12
19
13
19
14
19
15
19
16
19
17
19
18
19
19
19
20
19
21
19
22
19
23
19
24
19
25
19
26
19
27
19
28
19
29
19
30
19
31
19
32
Three Month
Two Month
One Month
Tr
a
di
ng
 V
o
lu
m
e 
of
 R
ice
 (U
nit
: O
ne
 th
ou
sa
nd
 
KO
KU
)
0
5000
10000
15000
Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1935c).
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Figure 4: Trading Volume of Rice in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange
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Data Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1935a).
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Figure 5: Delivery Volume in the Tokyo and Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchanges
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Data Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1935a,b,c).
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Figure 6: Import, Export, and Consumption Volume of Rice in Japan (1880 to 1932)
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(1) Toyo Keizai Shimpo Sha (1935, pp.5,154,485,504,592).
(2) Bank of Japan, Statistics Department (1966, pp.108–109).
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Figure 7: Total Amounts of Rice Arrived in Tokyo (1912 to 1932)
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Notes:
(1) The dataset is obtained from Sasaki (1937, pp.273,281–282).
(2) There are no statistics for the amount of rice arrived in 1923 because the
Great Kanto Earthquake occurred in Tokyo in September 1923.
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Figure 8: Total Amounts of Rice Arrived in Osaka (1912 to 1932)
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Data Sources:
(1) Osaka City Government (1919, ch.7, p.44).
(2) Osaka City Government (1925, ch.7, pp.854–855).
(3) Osaka City Government (1933, ch.5, pp.34–35).
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